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PRACTICAL PERSONAL INJURY PHASES
OF MARITIME LAW
HARNEY B. STOVER, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In discussing the personal injury phases of maritime law, we must
consider various categories of persons who can and do receive injuries
in and about vessels. These include seamen, passengers, visitors to the
vessel for one reason or another, and longshoremen and harbor workers.
II. SEAMEN
Seamen actually have three basic remedies in case of injury in
their capacity as seamen. These are recovery of maintenance and cure,
recovery of damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the
vessel, and recovery of damages under the Jones Act for injuries
caused by negligence.
A. SEAMEN-MAINTENANCE AND CURE
Maintenance and cure is the ancient maritime remedy of seamen
and was finalized in 1903 by Justice Brown in the famous case of The
Osceola.' In that case Justice Brown stated that "the vessel and her
owners are liable, in case a seaman falls sick, or is wounded, in the
service of the ship, to the extent of his maintenance and cure, and to his
wages, at least so long as the voyage is continued." Maintenance and
cure is analogous to workmen's compensation. Workmen's compen-
sation is an exclusive substitute for a tort action against one's em-
ployer and is limited to injuries received "in the course of employment."
The employer gives up the possibility of escape from all liability and
the employee gives up the possibility of a large sympathetic jury ver-
dict.2 Maintenance and cure, however, is not an exclusive remedy for
seamen and is not a substitute because the shipowner is liable for
maintenance and cure for all injuries received while the seaman is em-
ployed.3 The exceptions to this rule are cases of injuries caused by the
seaman's wilful misconduct 4 and injuries received prior to employment
and knowingly concealed. 5
* The author is a partner in the firm of Stover and Stover of Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
1 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
2 See generally, Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, ch., 1 (1952) ; Schnei-
der, Workmen's Compensation Law, 2d Ed., §1.
3 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) ; Aguilar v. Standard Oil
Co., 318 U.S. 724 (1943) ; Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949) ; War-
ren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951). Also see Mitchell v. Trawler Racer,
Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960), which approves the opinions in the first four cases
cited.
4 See cases, supra note 3.
5 Rosenquist v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 205 F. 2d 486 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Milton v. Pure
Oil Co., 264 F. 2d 892 (4th Cir. 1959).
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"Seaman" employed on a "vessel" qualify for maintenance and
cure.6 Whether or not one is a seaman is a question of fact' and gen-
erally the three basic requirements for a worker to qualify as a "sea-
man" in order to recover for maintenance and cure in case of an injury
are that the vessel be in navigation, that the worker have some perma-
nent connection with the vessel, and that the worker be employed
aboard the vessel primarily to aid in navigation." These are construed
liberally. The master,9 officers and members of the crew'0 of a vessel
are seamen and this includes temporary seamen such as a railroad brake-
man temporarily afloat on a car ferry." The term includes specialists,
such as stewards, 2 cooks, 1" maids,'1 4 waiters, 5 and probably musicians
and bartenders, as well as the deckhands and the engine room crew. It
does not generally include the employees of independent contractors
such as repairmen, longshoremen and harbor workers. 1 6 It does not
include some seamen employed by the United States Government who
have an exclusive remedy under the Federal Employees Compensation
Act.' 7 Foreign seamen on foreign owned and registered vessels are
ineligible for maintenance and cure because their remedies are deter-
mined by the law of the ship's flag.' The term "vessel" includes sea-
going, coastwise, river, harbor and Great Lakes shipping. It includes
6 The Osceola, supra note 1.
7 Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., 352 U.S. 370 (1957) ; Desper v. Starved
Rock Ferry Co., 342 U.S. 187 (1952).
8 South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940); Norton v.
Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565 (1944) ; Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., supra
note 7; Nelson v. Greene Line Steamers, 255 F. 2d 31 (6th Cir. 1958) ; A. L.
Mechling Barge Line v. Bassett, 119 F. 2d 995 (7th Cir. 1941) ; Hawn v. Ameri-
can S. S. Co., 107 F. 2d 999 (2d Cir. 1939).
9 Warner v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934) ; Murphy v. Light, 224 F. 2d 944 (5th
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 960 (1955) ; The E. H. Russell, 42 F. 2d 569(E.D.N.Y. 1930).
10 Carumbo v. Cape Cod S. S. Co., 123 F. 2d 991 (1st Cir. 1941); NORMIS, THE
LAW OF SEAMEN, Vol. 2, §549, p. 151 (1952).
11 Weiss v. Central R. R. Co. of N.J., 235 F. 2d 309 (2d Cir. 1956); Pennsylvania
R. Co. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334 (1953) held F.E.L.A. preferred and exclusive
to Longshoreman's Act; but a dissimilar result was reached in Zientek v.
Reading Co., 220 F. 2d 183 (3d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 846 (1955).
12 Pacific Mail S. S. Co. v. Schmidt, 214 Fed. 513 (9th Cir. 1914); Troupe v.
Chicago, Duluth & Georgian Bay Transit Co., 234 F. 2d 253 (2d Cir. 1956).
'3 Olsen v. The Patricia Ann, 152 F. Supp. 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1957); Haycraft v.
The Java Sea, 143 F. Supp. 303 (Ky. 1956) ; The James H. Shrigley, 50 Fed.
287 (N.Y. 1892).
14 Spellman v. American Barge Line, 176 F. 2d 716 (3d Cir. 1949); McLeod v.
Union Barge Line Co., 107 F. Supp. 371 (Pa. 1952).
15 Lawler v. Matson Navigation Co., 217 F. 2d 645 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied,
349 U.S. 912 (1955) ; Williams v. United States, 228 F. 2d 129 (4th Cir. 1955) ;
but in Schiemann v. Grace Line, Inc., 269 F. 2d 596 (2d Cir. 1959) a barber
who operated a barber shop aboard the S.S. Santa Maria and signed ship's
articles for a nominal rate was held not to be a seaman entitled to bring suit
under the Jones Act.
16 See cases, supra note 8. Calvino v. Farley, 23 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
1' Johansen v. United States, 343 U.S. 427 (1952).
18 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
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commercial and pleasure craft.' 9 It does not include a dead vessel laid
up for the winter or out of commission" or a partially completed struc-
ture.21 Dredges, canal boats and barges are borderline cases, although
liberal interpretation of the word will generally include almost all of
them. It is interesting to note that in 1921 Justice Cardozo and the New
York Court of Appeals, for certain purposes, held that a seaplane was
a "vessel" while in the water.2 2 This was later nullified by the Air Com-
merce Act.23
The right to recover maintenance and cure gives rise to a maritime
lien so that the right runs against both the ship and the shipowner, per-
mitting an action in rem in admiralty against the ship and an action in
personam in admiralty against the shipowner.24 An action at law under
the "saving to suitors" clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 as amended
to date25 can be brought in either state or federal court, provided that
service of process can be obtained on the shipowner and that the requi-
site diversity of citizenship and $10,000.00 amount in controversy exists
for the action at law in federal court.28 "Fact of employment" is the
test and no causal relationship is necessary between the seaman's em-
ployment and the injury.27 A seaman injured ashore while employed
by and in the service of the ship, even on shore leave, qualifies to re-
cover maintenance and cure.28 Wilful misconduct is the only bar to
recovery.2 9 Negligence is not wilful misconduct. Fighting or drinking
is not a bar and courts often excuse such conduct by saying that it is
the classic disposition or normal proclivity of seamen ashore to engage
in fisticuffs and imbibe heavily. 30 Neither overstaying one's leave nor
horseplay bar recovery.3
Maintenance is really another term for a living allowance for the
19 NoRRIs, MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES, pp. 23-26 (1959).2 0 Desper v. Starved Rock Ferry Co., supra note 7; Harris v. Whiteman, 243 F.
2d 563 (5th Cir. 1957); Antus v. Interocean S. S. Co., 108 F. 2d 185 (6th
Cir. 1939); Seneca Washed Gravel Corp. v. McManigal, 65 F. 2d 779 (2d
Cir. 1933); Krolczyk v. Waterways Navigation Co., 151 F. Supp. 873 (Mich.
1957).2
' Frankel v. Bethlehem-Fairfield Shipyard, Inc., 132 F. 2d 634 (4th Cir. 1942).
22 Reinhardt v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 195, 133 N.E. 371 (1921).
2372 Stat. 806 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §177(a) (1958).
24 The Osceola, supra note 1; Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, supra note 3; The
Bouker No. 2, 241 Fed. 831 (2d Cir. 1917).
2562 Stat. 931 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1333 (1958).
2672 Stat. 415 (1958), 28 U.S.C. §1332 (1958). See, 4 BENEOICT, ADMIRALTY,
§612, p. 201 and supp. (6th ed. 1940, supp. 1961).
27 Calmar S. S. Corp. v. Taylor, supra note 3.2 8 Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., supra note 3; Farrell v. United States, supra
note 3; Warren v. United States, supra note 3; but shore leave does not in-
clude a "leave of absence," Blanco v. S. S. Michael Tracy, 272 F. 2d 93 (4th
Cir. 1959).
29 See cases, supra note 3.
30 Warren v. United States, supra note 3.
"1 Murphy v. Light, supra note 9.
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individual seaman. 32 It does not cover any allowance for his family.
The liability of the shipowner for maintenance continues from the date
of injury until such time as a maximum cure is effected.33 Recovery
has been allowed for one or two years and even longer.34 Cases in re-
cent years have allowed from six dollars to eight dollars per day as
reasonable maintenance. 35 Union contracts often fix the amount of
maintenance and courts are prone to follow them.
Cure means medical expenses.36 As in the case of maintenance,
liability for cure continues to the point of maximum cure.37 A seaman
is not permitted to recover a lump sum for partial or total disability
based on his life expectancy. 3 Liability for cure continues so long as
there is a chance of improvement and can be revived in a hopeless case
by a new discovery causing a resumption of treatment. 39 Recovery in-
cludes past medical expenses plus those which can be definitely ascer-
tained for the immediate future. In the absence of a release for future
maintenance and cure, successive suits against the shipowner are per-
missible.40 In this regard, it might be well to mention that the hospital
facilities and personnel of the United States Public Health Service are
available for use by seamen without charge.4 Refusal to use the United
States Public Health Service or use of a private hospital or doctor by
an injured seaman is done at his own risk.42 However, if the Court
concludes that the government facilities and treatment are inadequate,
outside expenses are recoverable. 43 Either an oral or written contract
between an injured seaman and the shipowner, that the shipowner will
indemnify the seaman for all improper treatment received at the Public
Health Service Hospital is a valid enforceable maritime contract.43a
The duty of the shipowner to provide proper care is absolute. Failure
to do so, resulting in aggravation and causing increased medical ex-
penses or maintenance, makes the shipowner liable for such increased
32 Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, supra note 3.
33 Farrell v. United States, supra-note 3.
u Koslusky v. United States, 208 F. 2d 957 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Diniero v. United
States Lines, 185 F. Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
35 Hanson v. Reiss S. S. Co., 1961 A.M.C. 498 (D.C. Del. 1960); Spanos v. The
Lily, 261 F. 2d 214 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Diniero v. United States Lines, supra note
34; Descartes v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1958); F. De
Gagne v. Love's Fisheries, Inc., 125 F. Supp. 632 (D. Mass. 1954); Irwin v.
United States, 111 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1953).
36 See supra note 27.
37 See supra note 33.
38 See supra note 27.
39 See supra note 33.
40 See supra note 27.
-4162 Stat, 1018 (1948), 42 U.S.C. §249 (1958).
42 Benton v. United Towing Co., 120 F. Supp. 638 (N.D. Cal. 1954), aft'd, 224
F. 2d 558 (9th Cir. 1955).
43Williams v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Va. 1955), aff'd, 228 F.
2d 129 (4th Cir. 1955).43a Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 363 U.S. 838 (1961).
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expenses as well as for damages in a maintenance and cure action.44
This is the only situation where an injured seaman can recover damages
in a maintenance and cure action.
In addition to maintenance and cure, an injured seaman has the right
to recover wages and transportation from his shipowner-employer. 45
Wages are generally allowed to the end of the voyage which has been
construed by the courts to mean to the end of the term of employment.
This could mean the voyage or the term of the articles signed by the
seaman in signing aboard the ship.48 In 1953 the Second Circuit allowed
an injured seaman, employed aboard a bulk freighter on the Great
Lakes, to recover his wages for the balance of the season of navigation.
4 7
The injured seaman can also recover transportation expenses to the
hospital 8 and to his port of hire or home.4 9
The question of the right of the shipowner, who pays maintenance
and cure and wages to the end of the voyage to an injured seaman, to
indemnification from a third party tortfeasor is an interesting one.
Where both the shipowner-employer and third party are negligent, the
shipowner has no right to indemnification from the third party because
of the ancient doctrine prohibiting contribution between joint tort-
feasors.50 Where the third party is the sole tortfeasor, the question
becomes involved. Where the injured seaman sues the third party and
recovers and then brings suit aganist the shipowner on an unseaworthi-
ness theory, the shipowner is generally credited with the maintenance
and cure expenses recovered by the seaman from the third party. Where
the injured seaman brings suit against the shipowner-employer and
third party in one action, the third party is primarily liable for mainten-
ance and cure and the shipowner-employer is secondarily liable.51 Where
the injured seaman brings suit against the shipowner for maintenance
and cure and the shipowner seeks to implead the third party tortfeasor
or, after recovery, seeks to bring suit against the third party tortfeasor
for indemnification, there is a split of authority. The Second Circuit
has ruled against impleader or indemnity because recovery of mainten-
ance and cure is based upon the contract of employment and not tort. 2
44 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287 U.S. 367 (1932) ; Sims v. United States,
186 F. 2d 972 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 816 (1951); Neville v.
American Barge Line Co., 276 F. 2d 117 (3d Cir. 1960).
45 See, supra note 6.
46 Farrell v. United States, cited, supra note 3; Jones v. Waterman S. S. Corp.,
155 F. 2d 992 (3d Cir. 1946) ; Vitco v. Joncich, 130 F. Supp. 945 (S.D. Cal.
1955), aff'd, 234 F. 2d 161 (9th Cir. 1956).
47 Harriman v. Midland S. S. Line, Inc., 208 F. 2d 564 (2d Cir- 1953).
48 Spellman v. American Barge Line, supra note 14.49 Luth v. Palmer Shipping Corp., 210 F. 2d 224 (3d Cir. 1954).5o Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
51 The Jefferson Myers, 45 F. 2d 162 (2d Cir. 1930); Seely v. City of Newv
York, 24 F. 2d 412 (2d Cir. 1928).
52 The Federal No. 2, 21 F. 2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927).
1961]
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The Third Circuit has ruled in favor of impleader or indemnity because
such is permitted at common law.53 Professors Gilmore and Black in
their outstanding and authoritative textbook on The Law of Admiralty
argue that impleader or indemnity should be allowed because the injured
seaman could recover the equivalent of maintenance and cure directly
from the third party.54 The United States Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the question.
B. SEAMEN-UtNSEAWORTHINESS
The second remedy of the injured seaman against his shipownei-
employer is recovery of damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness
of the vessel. It is the duty of the shipowner to furnish seamen with a
seaworthy ship. This was first recognized in this country in an obscure
Pennsylvania District Court decision in 1789 which did not allow recov-
ery of damages for personal injuries but only gave seamen the right to
leave the ship without any penalties such as forfeiture of wages or
prosecution for desertion.55 The first authoritative statement giving sea-
men the right to recover damages for injuries caused by unseaworthi-
ness was again in 1903 by Justice Brown in The Osceola.5 6 During the
next seventeen to twenty years until passage of the Jones Act, it was
quite common for seamen to bring actions against their shipowner-em-
ployers for recovery of damages for injuries caused by unseaworthiness
of the vessel. After the Jones Act was passed, this remedy fell into
disuse until 1944 because of the doctrine of election of remedies in the
Jones Act which shall be discussed subsequently. The present doctrine
of unseaworthiness has been developed since 1944 when it was decided
in effect that unseaworthiness includes operating negligence. 57
The term "unseaworthiness" has become almost all inclusive. It
includes structural defects and defective machinery, appliances, furnish-
ings, equipment and tackle. 57 1 In the most recent authoritative decision
on this subject by the United States Supreme Court, it was held to be a
jury question whether a defective wrench (play in the jaw of the
wrench permitting it to slip) was such a defective appliance as to render
a ship unseaworthy. 5s Unseaworthiness includes incompetent or danger-
53Jones v. Waterman S. S. Corp., supra note 46.
- GILMORE &. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY (1957), pp. 276-77.
55 The Cyrus, 7 Fed. Cas. 755, Case No. 3930 (D. Pa. 1789).5 See, supra note 1.57 Mahnich v. Southern S. S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944).571See Mesle v. Kea S. S. Corp., 260 F. 2d 747 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 966 (1959) wherein the Court said that unseaworthiness claims are of
two categories: one where the shipowner, having knowledge-actual or con-
structive-that certain activity will occur, is imposed with an absolute duty
of supplying equipment for permitting the conduct and accomplishment in
reasonable safety of that activity; the other where the equipment actually
supplied by the owner for doing the ship's work proves incapable of perform-
ing its function in the manner for which it was designed. The Court then
exhaustively annotates the two categories.
58 Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325 (1960).
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ous officers and crew59 and has come to include almost all forms of oper-
ating negligence. The only clear exception to the term is in the case of
an injury caused by the unwise order of an otherwise competent officer
on an admittedly seaworthy ship. Such a circumstance would rarely arise.
The duty to provide a seaworthy ship is absolute, continuing and
non-delegable. A shipowner is not absolved by the exercise of due dili-
gence. 60 The shipowner is liable therefor even in cases where control
of a portion or all of the vessel is completely relinquished to repair-
men.6 1 The requirement of notice of the unseaworthy condition to the
master or shipowner has gradually disappeared. In the case of transi-
tory or temporary unseaworthiness such as soap, oil, grease, food, etc.
on the deck, the requirement of notice is unnecessary but there is
authority to the effect that sufficient opportunity to remedy the stiuation
must be present. 2 However, it was recently held that absolute liability
applies to transitory unseaworthiness but that the shipowner need only
furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use and not an accident-free ship.62
As in the case of maintenance and cure, if both the shipowner and
a third party are negligent, the shipowner has no right to indemnifica-
tion from the negligent third party because there is no contribution be-
tween joint tortfeasors. 63 Generally, if the unseaworthy condition was
caused solely by the negligence of the third party and was not such that
the shipowner should have known of it or the injuries occurred while
the vessel or concerned area was within the exclusive control of the
third party tortfeasor, the shipowner is granted the right of indemnifi-
cation. However, this is a general statement and will be delved into in
more detail subsequentlylin the discussion as to longshoremen and har-
bor workers.
C. "SEAMEN-NEGLIGENCE-ONES ACT
The third, and perhaps the most publicized, remedy of' the.injured
seamani against the shipowner is his right to recover damages for in-
juries caus'ed by negligence under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920,
commonly called the Joneg Act.64 Under the general maritime law, a
seaman had no remedy for injuries caused by the negligence of those
59 Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. S .S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955).
60 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) ; Mitchell v. Trawler Raceri
Inc., supra note 3.61 Petterson v. Alaska S. S. Co., 205 F. 2d 478 (9th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 396
(1954).
62 Poignant v. United States, 225 F. 2d 595 (2d Cir. 1955).
621 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra note 3; but the 4th Circuit has inter-
preted this to do away with the necessity for virtually any proof other than
fact of accident to the 'seaman, Grzybowski v. Arrow Barge Co., 283 F. 2d
481 (4th Cir. 1960); Puerto Seguro Cia. Naviera, S.A. v. Pitsillos, 279 F.
2d 599 (4th Cir. 1960).
63 See, supra note 50.
6441 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §688 (1958).
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
aboard the ship. This again was authoritatively stated by Justice Brown
in 1903 in The Osceola.65 In 1915 Congress sought to remedy this situ-
ation by abolishing the fellow servant doctrine as to seamen. In 1918
the United States Supreme Court held that this was insufficient and that
seamen still had no remedy for injuries by negligence. 66 In 1920 Con-
gress passed the Jones Act, which states as follows:
Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course
of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for
damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action
all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the
common-law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to rail-
way employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any sea-
man as a result of any such personal injury the personal repre-
sentative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at
law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes
of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action
for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable.
Jurisdiction in such actions shall be under the court of the district
in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal
office is located.
Perhaps the best way to study the Jones Act is to consider it phrase
by phrase. The word "seamen" has been liberally construed, as in the
case of maintenance and cure, and includes the master, officers and
members of the crew employed upon a vessel. In 1957 the United States
Supreme Court held that a handyman on a dredge was a seaman under
the Jones Act.6 7 Longshoremen are not now included under the Jones
Act because the right under that act is against the employer.68 However,
they may or may not be seamen for certain purposes. They were held
to be seamen to bring them within the unseaworthiness doctrine origi-
nally.6 9 They were once even held to be seamen under the Jones Act
7 0
but six months later the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Compen-
sation Act was passed as an exclusive remedy for longshoremen. The
term includes seamen employed by the United States Government, and
on United States ships operated by a general agent, the right is against
the United States. 71 However, when the Federal Employees Compen-
sation Act is applicable, it is exclusive.7 2 Foreign flag seamen do not
fall within the Jones Act in most situations although all have not as
65 See, supra note 1.
66 Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918).
67 Senko v. La Crosse Dredging Corp., supra note 7; authorities concerning who
is a seaman entitled to Jones Act remedies are extensively reviewed in Tuder
v. Material Service Corp., 177 F. Supp. 71 (N.D. Ill. 1959) ; also see Braen v.
Pfeifer Oil Transportation Co., 361 U.S. 129 (1959).
6s Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783 (1949).
69 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sier'acki, supra note 60.
70 International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926).
71 See, supra note 54, at 379-81.
72 See, supra note 17; Mills v. Panama Canal Co., 272 F. 2d 37 (2d Cir. 1959).
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yet been determined. Courts in this country will assume jurisdiction
where the seaman is a United States citizen or the ship is registered in
the United States or the shipowner owes allegiance to this country.73
The term "personal injury" has come to include all "industrial acci-
dent" types of injuries. It covers injuries occasioned by perils of the
sea. It includes assaults by superior officers74 and, in certain instances,
even by fellow seamen.7 - It includes aggravation of an existing illness
or injury from failure to provide proper maintenance and cure or from
negligent treatment by a ship's doctor.78 In this particular instance the
injured seaman has two remedies because he has the right to recover
damages also under the maintenance and cure remedy. The phrase "in
the course of his employment" has been given a broader meaning than
in state workmen's compensation acts. It has come to mean that the
seaman was injured while answerable to the call of duty or while in the
service of the ship. It depends upon the maritime nature of the employ-
ment and not upon the injury having resulted from a maritime tort.77
It includes injuries due to the shipowner's negligence even when the
injury occurs on a wharf alongside the ship.78 It must be remembered,
however, that by its very words the phrase includes only actions by an
employee against his employer.
The phrase "at his election" caused considerable trouble down
through the years. It was always clear that no election was required
between maintenance and cure and the Jones Act. Originally it was
thought to require election between negligence under the Jones Act and
recovery for unseaworthiness. 79 However, decisions holding that such
an election was necessary but that the one remedy was res judicata to
the other were anamolous. The weight of authority gradually came to
approve the view of the Third Circuit that the election required is be-
tween a suit in admiralty, without a jury, and an action at law, with or
without a jury. 0 This was indirectly, but probably conclusively, ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in 1958.81
"An action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury", has
7 See, supra note 18; also Romero v. International Term. Co., 358 U.S. 354(1959), rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 962 (1959).74Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635 (1930) ; Alpha. S. S. Corp. v. Cain, 281
U.S. 642 (1930).
75 Koehler v. Presque-Isle Transp. Co., 141 F. 2d 490 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 764 (1944).
76 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra note 44; De Zon v. American President
Lines, 318 U.S. 660 (1943).
7 O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943); Marceau
v. Great Lakes Transit Corp., 146 F. 2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 872 (1945).78 See cases, supra note 77.
70 Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U.S. 130 (1928).80 McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F. 2d 724 (3d Cir. 1949) ; Balado
v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 179 F. 2d 943 (2d Cir. 1950).
81 McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958).
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been interpreted to mean much more than it actually says. Even though
there is no mention of an admiralty action, the United States Supreme
Court has held that the injured seaman has the right to bring an in per-
sonam action in admiralty in the United States District Court located
where the employer resides or his principal place of business is located.
This was decided in order to avoid holding the Jones Act unconstitu-
tional because it deprived admiralty courts of jurisdiction over mari-
time causes of action.8 2 It is interesting to note that the injured seaman
only has a right to bring in an in personam action in admiralty so that
he has no lien against the vessel and no preferred status in limitation of
liability proceedings. As is stated in the act, the injured seaman has a
right to bring a civil action at law in the federal district court where
the employer resides or his principal place of business is located. Be-
cause the action is brought under the Jones Act, diversity of citizenship
is unnecessary but the $10,000.000 amount in controversy limitation
does apply. 3 State courts have concurrent jurisdiction over such ac-
tions.84 The term "jurisdiction" in the last sentence of the Jones Act
has been held to mean "venue". 5 Any action brought under the Jones
Act is subject to being marshalled with other claims into a limitation of
liability proceeding.
The Jones Act incorporates by reference the Federal Employers
Liability Act. 86 As to what provisions of the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act apply under the Jones Act, the United States Supreme Court
has developed what Professors Gilmore and Black refer to as a "rule of
reason". 7 It seems that the courts will apply the provisions of the
Federal Employers Liability Act to Jones Act actions where their appli-
cation appears to be reasonable and will not apply them where their
application appears to be unreasonable. The usual determining factor
is what is best for the injured seaman. It is undecided as to whether or
not amendments to the Federal Employers Liability Act are incorporated
into the Jones Act. One amendment changing the statute of limitations
under the Federal Employers Liability Act from two years to three
years has been incorporated into the Jones Act. 8 The three year limita-
tion is jurisdictional and cannot be waived or extended by agreement.
The cause of action accrues on the date of injury. Filing an action
within three years meets the requirement if service is made within a
82 Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 246 US. 375 (1924).
83 McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., supra note 80; Van Camp Sea Food
Co. v. Nordyke, 140 F. 2d 902 (9th Cir. 1944).84
-Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33 (1926); Panama R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U.S.
557 (1926).
85 See, supra note 82.
86 45 U.S.C. §§51-60 (1958).
87 See, supra note 54, at 298-99.
8862 Stat. 989 (1948), 45 U.S.C. §56 (1958) ; see supra note 81 and Cox v. Roth,
348 U.S. 207 (1955).
[Vol. 45
MARITIME LAW
reasonable time thereafter.8 9 Assumption of risk is not a defense.9 0
The fellow servant doctrine is inapplicable. Contributory negligence
is not a bar but merely operates to reduce recovery as in the case of
comparative negligence.91 There is no removal of a Jones Act action
from a state court to a federal court. Even though that provision was
dropped from the Federal Employers Liability Act in 1948, the Fifth
Circuit has held that it still applies to Jones Act actions.2 Hence, a
Jones Act count combined with causes of action for unseaworthiness and
maintenance and cure will make the entire action non-removable from
state court, but in order to insure that the action cannot be removed, it
is best to keep the claim for maintenance and cure below the jurisdic-
tional limit of $10,00.00.
"Negligence" under the Jones Act has been given a very broad
interpretation overlapping unseaworthiness because of the expressed
intention in the Federal Employers Liability Act for broad coverage.
93
Decisions have adopted the attitude that common law standards of neg-
ligence, even as applied under the Federal Employers Liability Act, do
not apply to maritime employment because the shipowner has a "higher
degree" of duty than other employers 9 4 Though this is a harsh doctrine
as to shipowners, it fits in with the absolute duty of the shipowner to
provide seamen with a seaworthy vessel. The range of negligence is
wide. It includes almost all types of unseaworthiness including failure
to hire a competent crew and failure to exclude from a crew incompe-
tent or dangerous persons.95 In this respect, decisions often speak of it
as the "negligent failure to provide a seaworthy ship" or the "violation
of the duty to provide a safe place to work". 8 It is probable that in
time it will be expanded to include shore injuries as well. It does not
include unseaworthiness for which the shipowner is not at fault. Negli-
gence under the Jones Act includes the negligent acts of commission or
omission of the mastei, officers and members of the crew of the vessel.
It does not as yet include the negligent acts of indeperident contractors
such as stevedores and repairmen or their employees, but of course these
89 Sgambati v. United States, 172 F. 2d 297 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 337 U.S.
938 (1949).
90 53 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §54 (1958); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S.
110 (1936); Beadle v. Spencer, 298 U.S. 124 (1936); Dunbar v. Henry Du
Bois' Sons Co., 275 F. 2d 304 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 815 (1960).
9135 Stat. 66 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §53 (1958) ; Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S.
752 (1942) ; Dunbar v. Henry Du Bois' Sons Co., supra note 90.
92 Pate v. Standard Dredging Corp., 193 F. 2d 498 (5th Cir. 1952).
9353 Stat. 1404 (1939), 45 U.S.C. §51 (1958).
94 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, supra note 44; also see supra note 54, at
310-11.
95 See the annual and five year digests of American Maritime Cases; 2 Nomus,
THE LAW OF SEAMEN §686 (1952, Supp. 1961) ; BENEDirc, ADmIuALTY §25 (6th
ed. 1940, Supp. 1961).
96 See, supra note 54, at 313.
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could cause unseaworthiness. It includes failure to provide proper
maintenance and cure.9 7
As to negligence under the Jones Act, along with the "higher degree"
of duty doctrine, courts have developed a doctrine of "permissable
inferences from unexplained events" similar to the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine.98 Together these two doctrines give rise to an interesting con-
clusion for Jones Act actions. The burden of proof is on the seaman-
plaintiff. He must prove duty and breach, or negligent violation of the
duty, but proof of duty has been lightened by the "higher duty" doc-
trine. He must also prove causation and injury but the burden here has
been lightened by the "permissable inferences" doctrine. We have al-
most reached the point where the injured seaman need not show much
more than that he was injured and that the injury could have been
caused by the negligence of the shipowner. Actually whether or not the
plaintiff can sustain the burden is really only important now in actions
under the survival provisions of the Jones Act. According to some
writers, the Jones Act is obsolete since almost all forms of operating
negligence fall within the unseaworthiness remedy. 9 They look for the
Jones Act to be abandoned completely within not too many years. This
may not be the case, however, because early in 1959 the Fourth Circuit
very firmly held that courts have not as yet extended the doctrine of
unseaworthiness to include the negligent use of seaworthy appliances, 100
and the United States Supreme Court still emphatically distinguishes
between the two remedies.' 0
D. SEAMEN-SUMMARY
In summary as to his remedies, the injured seaman has the right to
recover maintenance and cure to the point of maximum cure and wages
to the end of the term of employment from the shipowner. He can do
this in an action in admiralty in rem against the ship or in personam
against the shipowner or both. This action would be brought in federal
court without a jury. The injured seaman can also enforce this right at
law in federal court, at his election with or without a jury, provided
service of process can be had upon the shipowner and the jurisdictional
requisites of diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy be-
ing more than $10,000.00 can be met. Provided he can serve the ship-
owner, the injured seaman can also enforce his right in state court with
9 See, supra note 76.
98 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46 (1948).
99 See, supra note 54, at 315.
100 Penedo Cia Naviera S.A. v. Maniatis, 262 F. 2d 284 (4th Cir. 1959) ; however,
on remand the trial court then held the appliance unseaworthy, Maniatis v. The
Archipelago, 176 F. Supp. 63 (E.D. Va. 1959), and the appellate court affirmed,
273 F. 2d 618 (4th Cir. 1960) ; also see Billeci v. United States, 185 F. Supp.
711 (N.D. Cal. 1960), and 9th Cir. decisions cited therein.
101 See, supra note 58; Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., sipra note 3.
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or without a jury. As to his right to recover damages for injuries re-
ceived on account of the unseaworthiness of the vessel, the seaman has
the same remedies as he does to recover maintenance and cure. The
seaman's third remedy is under the Jones Act to recover damages
for injuries received through negligence. This remedy can be en-
forced in admiralty in an action in personam against the shipowner
without a jury trial but the action must be commenced in the district
where the shipowner-employer resides or his principal place of business
is located. The injured seaman can also enforce his rights under the
Jones Act in an action at law in federal court with or without a jury,
provided the amount claimed is in excess of $10,000.00 and the action
is commenced in the district where the shipowner-employer resides or
his principal place of business is located. An action under the Jones
Act can also be brought in state court, with or without a jury, provided
service of process can be had upon the shipowner. The usual procedure
is to combine all three causes of action, for maintenance and cure, dam-
ages from unseaworthiness, and damages from negligence, in one action.
This can be brought in state court where service of process can be had
upon the shipowner. As was pointed out previously, in an action in
state court it would be wise to hold the claim for maintenance and cure
below $10,00.00 so that the case cannot be removed to federal court.
All three causes of action can be combined at law in one action in fed-
eral court provided the amount in controversy is over $10,000.00. Since
claim for maintenance and cure is rarely as high as $10,00.00, in such
cases it is best to combine all three counts but bring the counts for unsea-
worthiness and negligence at law with a jury demand and the count for
maintenance and cure in admiralty. Of course, the venue, because of the
Jones Act limitation, must be in the district where the shipowner resides
or his principal place of business is located. Since venue can be waived,
many shipowners are willing to appear voluntarily in other districts in
order to have the suit in federal district court rather than in a local
state court where it would be subject to local rules of procedure.
III. PASSENGERS
Passengers are those persons carried on a vessel pursuant to an
express or implied contract with payment of fare or some equivalent.
1 0 2
As to passengers the ship is a common carrier 0 3 and the duty of the
shipowner to his passengers is to provide them with safe passage or
transportation. A passenger injured during the course of his passage
or transportation is not owed the duty by the shipowner of being pro-
102 The Vueltabajo, 163 Fed. 594 (S.D. Ala. 1908) ; also see The Main v. Williams,
152 U.S. 122 (1894); BLAcK's LAW DICroNARY, p. 1280 (4th ed. 1951).
103 Weade v. Dichmann, Wright & Pugh, 337 U.S. 801 (1949); also see New
Jersey Steamboat Co. v. Brockett, 121 U.S. 637 (1887) ; The "City of Panama,"
101 U.S. 453 (1879).
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vided with a seaworthy vessel."' As a result, he does not have a right
to recover damages for injuries received because of the unseaworthiness
of the vessel and has no maritime lien against the vessel.
An injured passenger can bring an action in admiralty or at law
against the shipowner for negligence or fault resulting in injury. As to
passengers, it is generally stated that the shipowner owes a "high degree
of care" but the carrier is not an insurer.10 5 The ship must be navigated
with skill, care and competence, and the shipowner must use reasonable
care to protect the passengers from harm. 10 The shipowner must warn
the passengers of danger, 10 7 must provide a reasonably safe means of
embarking and disembarking,0 s and must provide adequate medical
services. 10 9 If a doctor is maintained aboard the ship, he must be com-
petent and well supplied. If there is no doctor aboard the ship but one
is required by an injured person, the shipowner must furnish one at the
nearest available port. If there is no doctor aboard the ship, the ship's
medicine chest must be made available for the use of passengers. Gen-
erally, contributory negligence is not a bar but only serves to reduce
recovery and most courts apply the general martime law of comparative
negligence in the case of an injured passenger. 110 An injured passenger
also may bring an action in admiralty or at law against the shipowner
for breach of the express or implied contract to transport the passenger
safely."'
A carrier cannot contract against liability or limit its liability by
contract."12 A carrier cannot limit its liability or absolve itself from
liability by requiring notice of injury within a period of less than six
months from the date of the injury."3 Even if notice 'is properly re-
quired within a period in excess of six months from the date of the
injury, such restrictions will be waived if the carrier was not prejudiced
by failure to receive notice of injury. Also, the carrier cannot limit the
time for commencement of legal proceedings to less than one year from
the date of injury.114
104 The recent decision of Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358
U.S. 625 (1959), makes this quite clear.
105 Moore v. American Scantic Line, 121 F. 2d 767 (2d Cir. 1941); Moore-
McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Russak, 266 F. 2d 573 (9th Cir. 1959).
106 Voltinann v. United Fruit Co., 147 F. 2d 514 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Moore v. Ameri-
can Scantic Line, supra note 105.
107 The Korea Maru, 254 Fed. 397 (9th Cir. 1918); Savage v. New York, N. & H.
S. S. Co., 185 Fed. 778 (2d Cir. 1911).
108 Marshall v. Westfal-Larsen & Co., 259 F. 2d 575 (9th Cir. 1958).
109 See, supra note 19, at 234-36.
110 The decision in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note
104 would appear to force this result; see supranote 19, at 246.
111 The "City of Panama," supra note 103.
112 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §183(c) (1958).
113 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §183 (b) (a) (1958).
11449 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. §183(b) (b) (1958).
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IV. VISITORS AND BUSINESS INVITEES
Visitors aboard a ship are owed the duty of reasonable care by the
shipowner, whether such visitors are on business in connection with
the cargo or vessel management or are friends or relatives visiting pass-
engers or members of the crew."1 5 This would include such categories
of passengers who commonly come aboard ships as vessel agents, mem-
bers of the Coast Guard, immigration officials, ship chandlers, marine
surveyors and even the ship's lawyers.
V. LONGSHOREMEN AND HARnOR WORKERS
One of the largest categories of persons who are apt to receive mari-
time injuries is that of longshoremen and harbor workers. The duty of
a shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel extends to longshoremen and
almost all types of harbor workers aboard the vessel provided they are
there to serve the ship. n1 6 The duty of reasonable care is owed to all
longshoremen and harbor workers. One cannot consider injuries to
longshoremen and harbor workers without studying the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act passed by Congress in 1927.n1
It established a compensation commission which was to appoint deputy
commissioners to administer the act. The functions of the commission
have since been transferred to the Secretary of Labor.
The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act provides that com-
pensation is payable for disability or death resulting from injuries aris-
ing out of and in the course of employment, 18 provided that the death
or disability results from an injury occurring on the navigable waters
of the United States, including any drydock, and that recovery may not
validly be provided by state law. 1-9 No compensation is payable to the
master or members of the crew of any vessel, any person engaged by
the master to load or unload and repair any small vessel under 18 tons
net, an officer or employee of the United States Government or any
agency thereof or any state or foreign government or any political sub-
division thereof, and any person injured or killed solely by reason of
his intoxication or his wilful intent to injure or kill himself or another. 20
In the case of the last restriction there is a presumption against the
presence of intoxication or wilful intent to injure or kill in the absence
of convincing evidence otherwise.' 2 ' Horseplay has been held not to bar
recovery under the act.
122
There is absolute liability for the employer based upon recovery
115 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note 104.
116 See, supra notes 69 and 115.
117 33 U.S.C. §§901-50 (1958).
318 64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. §902(2) (1958).
11944 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §903 (1958).
120 Ibid.
12144 Stat. 1436 (1827), 33 U.S.C. §920 (1958).
122 General Accident Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Crowell, 76 F. 2d 341 (5th Cir.
1935).
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schedules setting up recovery for temporary partial, temporary total,
permanent partial and permanent total disability.12 3 In the case of an
employer who is a subcontractor, his contractor is liable unless the sub-
contractor has secured payment. 2 4 The injured worker's remedy under
the Longshoreman and Harbor Workers Act is exclusive as against his
employer. For that reason the employer who has not complied with the
act may be held liable in an action for damages and in such action the
defenses of fellow servant, contributory negligence and assumption of
risk are abolished.1
5
The Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act has had an interesting
development. In three different cases in 1917 the United States Supreme
Court held Workmen's Compensation Acts in New York, Iowa and
Washington to be constitutional. 26 Two months later in that same year
the Supreme Court held the New York act to be unconstitutional as
applied to a longshoreman because he was injured aboard ship while
performing maritime work under a martime contract and so came within
admiralty jurisdiction.' 27 The court held that to apply the state act
would be contrary to a national uniformity of the maritime law, that
the power to modify maritime law was in Congress, that only common
law remedies were covered by the "saving to suitors" clause and not
statutory compensation acts, and that a state compensation remedy was
inconsistent with the policy of Congress to encourage investment in
shipping evidenced by the limitation of liability acts of 1851. Later in
1917 Congress amended the "saving to suitors" clause to include claim-
ants' rights and remedies under state workmen's compensation laws but
in 1920 that amendment was held unconstitutional as an invalid delega-
tion of federal power to the state. 2 s In 1922 a second amendment was
also held unconstitutional.' 9 Early in 1927 the United States Supreme
Court held longshoremen to be "seamen" under the Jones Act,130 but six
months later Congress passed the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers
Act as an exclusive remedy against the employer and that decision of
the Supreme Court was nullified. 31
In 1932 the United States Supreme Court held the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act to be constitutional. 3 2 In that
12344 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §904 (1958).
124 Ibid.
12544 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958).
126 New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917); Hawkins v.
Bleakly, 243 U.S. 210 (1917) ; Mountain Timber Co. v. State of Washington,
243 U.S. 219 (1917).
127 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
328 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920)
129 State of Washington v. W. C. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
130 See, supra note 70.
131 For complete, concise and interesting coverage of this history see supra note
54, at 333-37.
132 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
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same decision the court held that deputy commissioners' findings of fact
are not reviewable unless they are not supported by the evidence but
made an exception as to "fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts. Ques-
tions as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship and
whether or not the injury occurred on navigable waters were held to be
fundamental questions of fact reviewable by the courts. All other
questions have since been held not to be reviewable. Whether a claim-
ant is a member of a crew,' 33 whether an injury arose out of the "course
of employment"' 34 and whether the employer had proper notice 35 have
been held to be facts not subject to review. The findings of fact of the
deputy commissioner as to the employment relationship and the ques-
tion of navigable waters probably are the only findings which may still
be reviewed by a court.
From the passage of the act in 1927 until 1942 the Supreme Court
developed the "maritime but local" theory and applied it to each specific
case which came along.'3 6 Under that theory where the claimant's occu-
pation was maritime but so local in nature as not to relate to navigation
and commerce, the application of the state compensation law was re-
quired because such would not affect the uniformity of the maritime
law. This caused all sorts of trouble because of limitations of actions.
A claimant would seek his remedy under the Longshoremen and Har-
bor Workers Act and find that he really belonged under the state work-
men's compensation act or vice-versa with the result that when he
finally found out where he was supposed to be, his time for bringing an
action or making claim had run out. The "maritime but local" theory
proved so unsatisfactory that in 1942 the United States Supreme Court
expounded and subsequently developed the "twilight zone" doctrine.
3 7
This was to the effect that there is a twilight zone of cases between the
area where the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act is the exclusive
remedy against the employer and where the state workmen's compensa-
tion act is exclusive. Within that twilight zone there is a presumption
of constitutionality of the state statute. Whether or not the case falls
within the twilight zone is a question of fact and not of law. Though
this doctrine has numerous complications, its application has generally
proved much more satisfactory than the old "maritime but local" theory.
Since pronouncement of the theory, the courts have steadily
broadened the twilight zone category.13 If the state's compensation
133 South Chicago Coal & Dock Co. v. Bassett, supra note 8.
4'Leary v. Brown-Pacific-Maxon, Inc., 340 U.S. 504 (1951).
235 Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328 (1953).
136 See, supra note 54, at 344-48.
137 Davis v. Department of Labor, 317 U.S. 249 (1942).
138 See Rodes, Workmen's Compensation for Maritime Employees: Obscurity in
the Twilight Zone, 68 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1955) ; also see, supra note 54, at
350-58.
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commission declines jurisdiction, it will be reversed, such being a ques-
tion of fact. If the worker who has incurred a twilight zone injury
seeks his remedy under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act,
the deputy commissioner's findings will be final if supported by the
evidence and are not reviewable by the courts. This has simplified matters
considerably and has led to many more claimants seeking their remedies
under the applicable state workmen's compensation act which is usually
more liberal than the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act. There
is authority that if recovery is made first under the state workmen's
compensation act, and the recovery permitted under the Longshoremen
and Harbor Workers Act is greater, the excess may be sought under
the federal act even though there has already been recovery under the
state act.
139
Written notice of the injury must be served upon the employer and
the deputy commissioner within thirty days after the date of injury or
death.14 0 Claim must be made within one year after the accident, death
or last voluntary payment by the employer, if any. 41 The requirement
of written notice within thirty days may not bar recovery under the act if
the employer knew of the injury and is not prejudiced by failure to re-
ceive notice or if the deputy commissioner wishes to excuse the neces-
sity of written notice for some satisfactory reason. 4 2 The objections of
failure to give written notice or failure to file claim within one year
must be raised at the first hearing or they are waived.14 3 No election is
necessary as between compensation under the act and an action against
a third party. 44 Acceptance of compensation benefits under an award
by the deputy commissioner operates as an assignment to the employer
of all of the injured worker's rights to recover damages against a third
party unless the employee commences an action against the third party
within six months after the award is made' 4 5 If the employer or his
assignee recovers from the third party, four-fifths of the excess over
the amount of the compensation, medical expenses and expenses of
suit are to be turned over to the employee. 4, Where an insurer assumes
the compensation payments, the insurer is subrogated to the employer's
rights. 4 7
In 1946 the United States Supreme Court held that a longshoreman
could sue a shipowner, whether or not the shipowner was negligent, for
'139 Western Boat Bldg. Co. v. O'Leary, 198 F. 2d 409 (9th Cir. 1952) ; Newport
News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. O'Hearne, 192 F. 2d 968 (4th Cir. 1951).14044 Stat. 1431 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §912(a) (1958).
141144 Stat. 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §913(a) (1958).
14244 Stat. 1431 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §912(d) (1958).
143Id. and 44 Stat. 1432 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §913(b) (1958).
'4464 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. §933(a) (1958).
-45 64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. §933(b) (1958).
'46 64 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. §933 (e) (1958).
14764 Stat. 1271 (1950), 33 U.S.C. §933(h) (1958).
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damages for unseaworthiness in addition to his receiving compensation
from his stevedore-employer under the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers Act. 45 This decision opened up an entirely new field of litiga-
tion in the maritime law. In 1953 the doctrine was extended to almost
all types of harbor workers, even including the carpenter-employee of
a repairman. 149 In this same decision the court held that longshoremen
and harbor workers also have the privilege of business invitees aboard
ship to recover damages for operating negligence. In 1952 the Supreme
Court considered a situation wherein an injured worker sought to re-
cover damages for negligence from the shipowner and the shipowner
in turn sought indemnification from the stevedore-employer of the
worker.'50 Though the shipowner was found to be only 25% responsible
and the stevedore was found to be 75% responsible, the shipowner was
denied indemnification from the stevedore because of the ancient pro-
hibition against contribution between joint tortfeasors. This was then
taken to mean that an injured longshoreman or harbor worker could
recover damages from a shipowner for unseaworthiness and, even if the
unseaworthiness was caused solely by the operating negligence of the
stevedore, the shipowner had no right of indemnification against the
stevedore. This placed the ultimate burden on the shipowner who really
was not negligent in any respect but such was considered appropriate
on the basis that stevedores should be entitled to limit their liability
which is absolute under the Longshoremen and Harbor Workers Act.
This resulted in considerable injustice to shipowners and in 1955 the
United States Supreme Court held that a shipowner's claim against a
stevedore-employer of an injured longshoreman is not because of the
injury but is based upon a contractual right of indemnification, express
or implied. 5 ' It was held that the contract between the stevedore and
the shipowner contains a warranty of workman-like service, express if
written in and implied if not. This was held to extend to the handling
of cargo and later even to equipment incidental to cargo handling. 52
It has been held that the warranty may be breached when the stevedore's
negligence only serves to call into play the vessel's unseaworthiness,
provided the injury ocurs within the area over which the stevedore has
exclusive control and the unseaworthiness is not completely latent.1 5 3
At first it was held that there must be a direct contractual relationship
between the shipowner and the stevedore but that has since been held
unnecessary and the warranty of workmanlike service applies even if
148 See, supra note 69.
149 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
150 See, supra note 50.
151 Ryan Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Pan-Atlantic S. S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
152 Weyerhaeuser S. S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., Inc., 355 U.S. 563 (1957).
153 See, supra note 19 for the cases gathered in footnotes to §§59, 60; also see
Santomarco v. United States, 277 F. 2d 255 (2d Cir. 1960).
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the stevedore is hired by a charterer'" or the consignee of the cargo. 115
The result is that both the vessel and the shipowner are third party
beneficiaries of the unloading or loading contract, no matter by whom
the contract is made. The stevedore now ultimately bears the risk in
case of injury to his employee unless the shipowner is negligent. Be-
cause of the diversified nature of the work and the areas wherein it is
carried on in the case of longshoremen and harbor workers, the em-
ployer, usually a stevedore, now should carry liability insurance, work-
men's compensation insurance and longshoremen and harbor workers
compensation insurance.
VI. WRONGFUL DEATH
Any phase of personal injuries, even that connected with the mari-
time law, cannot be examined without at least briefly considering
wrongful deaths. Under the general maritime law, seamen had no rem-
edy for wrongful death and there was no survival of actions.156 Seamen
now have two remedies, one under the Federal Employers Liability Act
incorporated into the Jones Act"' which makes state death acts inappli-
cable' 58 and the other under the Death on the High Seas Act."59 Under
the Federal Employers Liability Act incorporated into the Jones Act, the
carrier, if negligent, is liable to the personal representative of the de-
ceased seaman for the benefit of certain classes. 160 The first class in-
cludes the widow or husband and children; the second class includes
the parents; the third class includes the next of kin dependent upon
the seaman-employee. There is priority as between the classes and the
measure of recovery is pecuniary loss.' 6 1 The right of action for injury
survives for the benefit of those same classes'62 The Death on the
High Seas Act covers death "caused by wrongful act, neglect or default
occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any state". 6' The remedy is exclusively an action in admiralty. There
is one class of beneficiaries including the wife, husband, children,
parents and dependent relatives. The measure of recovery is pecuniary
loss based upon life expectancy, probable earnings and the amount of
contribution to the members of the class. 6 4 The time limitation for
commencing suit under the Death on the High Seas Act is two years
after the wrongful act, neglect or default causing death with provision
" Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959).
155 Waterman S. S. Corp. v. Dugan & McNamara, Inc., 364 U.S. 421 (1960).156 Cortes v. Baltimore Insular Line, cited supra note 44.
"5 See text of Jones Act, supra, 45 U.S.C. §51 (1958).
158 Lindgren v. United States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930).
"59 46 U.S.C. §§761-68 (1958).
16o Supra note 93.
161 St. Louis & Iron Mtn. Ry. Co. v. Craft, 237 U.S. 648 (1915).
162 36 Stat. 291 (1910), 45 U.S.C. §59 (1958).
163 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 45 U.S.C. §761 (1958).
164 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 45 U.S.C. §762 (1958).
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for an additional ninety days to secure jurisdiction. 65 Under the Jones
Act the time limitation for commencement of an action is three years
from the date of death.166 On the Great Lakes and Inland Waters the
personal representative of the deceased seaman has only the remedy
under the Jones Act. For death on the high seas, the personal repre-
sentative has a remedy under both the Jones Act and the Death on the
High Seas Act. In such cases in order to reap the benefit of the survival
provisions of the Jones Acti as set forth in the Federal Employers Lia-
bility Act, and the fact of only one large class of beneficiaries under the
Death on the High Seas Act, causes of action under both acts are fre-
quently combined in admiralty without a jury.
In the case of passengers, the remedy for wrongful death on the
high seas is under the Death on the High Seas Act1 67 and in state terri-
torial waters the remedy for wrongful death is under the applicable
state wrongful death act. The same situation applies to all visitors and
business invitees aboard a vessel. Longshoremen and harbor workers
have a remedy under the applicable state death act in the case of local
and twilight zone deaths and the remedy under the Longshoreman and
Harbor Workers Compensation Act where the state death act is inappli-
cable.' 68
As a general rule, it can be said that the general maritime law is the
substantive law applied by the courts, no matter whether state or federal,
in considering all of these remedies, with exception as to the application
of state wrongful death acts.'6 9 Where the state wrongful death act is
applicable, there is considerable confusion which has been brought about
by four recent decisions of the United States Supreme CourtY.1' To
this date it is somewhat uncertain as to whether the court applying the
state wrongful death act should apply state law or the general maritime
law within the confines and restrictions of the state act.' It is hoped
that this situation will be clarified by the United States Supreme Court
within the very near future.
VII. CONCLUSION
This article is only meant to serve as a basic outline for the general
'16541 Stat. 537 (1920), 45 U.S.C. §763 (1958).
166 Supra note 88.
167 See, supra note 159.
168 See, supra note 118.
169 Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, supra note 104; Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, supra note 60; Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co.,
317 U.S. 239 (1942); Chelentis v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., supra note 66;
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, supra note 127.
170 Goett v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 U.S. 340 (1960); Hess v. United States,
361 U.S. 314 (1960) ; Halecki v. United New York & New ,Jersey Pilots Ass'n.,
358 U.S. 613 (1959) ; Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
171 An excellent discussion of the four cases, supra note 170, is found in Harolds,
Maritime Death Claims and the Applicability of State Law, 35 TuLANE L.
REv. 85 (1960).
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consideration of attorneys and other interested persons who are not
thoroughly familiar with this particular area of the admiralty and mari-
time law. Comment has led the author to hope that it may also prove of
value to the maritime industry as a practical working guide with which
to approach the general field of maritime personal injuries. Questions
concerning maritime personal injuries are frequently complex but not
insurmountable. Volumes have been written on the subject and should
be consulted with reference to specific situations as they arise.1 72 This
is probably the most active and changing field embraced within the so-
called maritime law . The practitioner within it must constantly be
alert to keep abreast of the latest developments.
172 As well as the various texts cited throughout the course of this article,
EDELMAN, MARITIME INJURY AND DEATH (1960), released for distribution
since the text of this article was prepared, should prove to be a useful tool
in the hands of practitioners within this field.
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